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# Henry J. Taylor / Spy business

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THAT the traffic in international secrets is a horrible business — outrageously glamorized on television and in fiction — is bared again by the Paris implication that the French espionage apparatus framed former agent Roger de Louette into his recent dope-smuggling arrest here to get rid of him.

Television and fiction feature women in their glamorization, of course. This only compounds the nonsense. Espionage apparatuses seldom use women, the notable exceptions notwithstanding.

Women are brought in only occasionally as mere decoys. To cite a specific case, there was the one involving Polish women under the control of the Soviet KGB espionage apparatus in Warsaw. All spoke English and were protégés of one Ursula Marie Discher, who had successfully entrapped tried-and-convicted foreign service officer Irwin N. Scarbeck of our Warsaw embassy.

These decoys compromised 10 U.S. embassy Marine guards responsible for embassy security, the nightly locking of safes, etc. This example is typical. But, universally, espionage managers fear a woman may become emotionally involved.

ACTUALLY, women are more often involved in a reverse way.

Not too long ago the wife of an American foreign service officer at a key post in Europe made a trip to Moscow. KGB agents hiding in her Moscovia Hotel bedroom spurted her with an odorless gas which leaves one unconscious but otherwise unharmed. Undressing her, they made her the victim of ghastly embarrassing photographs which they used to force her husband to supply classified information. The husband himself exposed this to the State Department, but it cost him his foreign service career.

Similarly, the KGB photographed former British Navy Cmdr. Anthony Courtney, a member of Parliament, during a bedroom intimacy with a British woman in Moscow. Except for anonymous threats, neither Cmdr.

Courtney nor his companion had any knowledge of this until on the floor of Parliament he urged the expulsion of a number of Soviet spies from the Soviet's London embassy.

Within 24 hours the embarrassing photographs reached selected members of Parliament and one packet was put under the door of the Prime Minister's No. 10 Downing Street residence.

THE prize — and priceless — information sought by any espionage apparatus is: What are the enemy's intentions and capabilities? This requires penetration at the decision-making, policy-making level. There are always enemy agents masquerading as friends and colleagues of high government officials. Every government is penetrated by enemy agents. Every intelligence service — including ours — operates on the basic assumption that its own government is penetrated. The only question is: To what extent?

Former CIA chief Allen W. Dulles once stated that "the Soviet had over 40 high-level agents in Washington during World War II. At least that many were uncovered. We don't know how many remained undetected."

It would be inconceivable to any experienced intelligence manager in this horrible business — this falsely glamorized blend of terror and blackmail, ugly and brutish — that there are any fewer secretly in place in Washington today.